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Introduction
The technology around us enables incredible abilities such as high-resolution video
calls and the ability to stay connected with everyone we care about through social
media. Yet, it typically comes with an unseen cost. The computers we carry with
us in our pockets, backpacks, and on our wrists are constantly receiving and, more
importantly, sending data to many more places than is apparent (Valentino-DeVries
et al. 2018). In order to make their services free, many online companies sell data
or access to targeted demographics in the form of advertising as a means of making
their profit.
On its surface, this may not seem so bad. Who cares if Facebook knows what
websites I go to? Why does it matter if Uber knows where I am all the time? These
questions are not too far from the ones I have heard in everyday conversation with
peers, professors, friends, and family. The issue comes down to what these companies
do with the data they collect and who they share it with. When you take time to
fully consider the consequences of one app or website having your name, birthday, a
record of your location, and your payment information, it becomes easier to recognize
the hazards of this broad data collection.
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A trend in computer science, and examples could be drawn for any field, in recent
history has been the invention of new technology and processes with limited consider-
ation for the consequences or long term negative effects. This is especially relevant to
user privacy and data collection. Many current college students can probably recall
growing up hearing adults say “Don’t use your real name online” and “Don’t tell
anyone online where you live or any personal information”. Yet, we now live in a
world where people’s entire lives exist in their Facebook and Instagram profiles and
massive amounts of personal information are available publicly. The issue is that the
average user does not understand how their data is used.
This shift has made me curious about people’s relationship with their data. In this
work, I explore what data is collected online by different websites and applications,
what do users know is being collected, how do they feel about the data being collected,
and what ethical considerations should be made by the companies collecting the data.
1.1 Motivation
The potential risk to people’s privacy and security due to data collection should be
concerning for everyone. My thesis has two primary goals. The first is to bring
attention to this issue in the computing community to encourage software developers
to think critically about the positive and negative outcomes of their work. Secondly, I
hope to motivate people to be more conscious of their online privacy and question why
a web service is asking for certain information instead of blindly giving permission.
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1.2 Previous Work
The concept of this thesis came about from a collection of sources, including read-
ings of scholarly literature, previous coursework, internship experience, and general
observations of my peers.
In my final paper for CSCI 245 Life, Computers, and Everything, a course on com-
puter ethics, I explored the ethics of data collection by social media companies in
connection with the profit made on collected user data. These companies treat in-
formation on users like commodities and package it as a product valued for intensely
targeted marketing. Through my research for this paper, it became evident that most
users are unaware of the extent and the amount of data that is collected about them.
This concept is the focus of Winkler and Zeadally (2016), who studied the readability
of terms of service agreements for popular social media platforms. Ultimately, Win-
kler and Zeadally (2016) discovered that the terms of service agreements that they
studied were written at a high school level, but half of all Americans do not read
above an eighth grade level. This class inspired my further interest in who collects
and controls user data and also how users interact with computers when it comes to
their data.
My internships in the last two summers provided me with learning experiences and
information on the topic of data collection and personal attitudes toward privacy
that are relevant to this thesis. At the Federal Housing Finance Agency in 2018, all
employees were brought to a lecture on security best practices where I learned key
points of information security and again saw cases where highly educated people were
previously unaware of how important strong security practices were to protect the
information to which they had access. A year later in 2019, at ASML, a world leader
in optical lithography, I attended a company-wide meeting where it was projected
that, by the end of 2020, there would be 44 zettabytes of data in the world. (One
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zettabyte is one trillion gigabytes of data.) Considering that a large portion of this
data will be personally identifiable information, potential that this data can be used
in hazardous ways.
Finally, interacting with my peers has led me to conclude that many students do not
consider the risks of how much data is collected or are ambivalent to issues regard-
ing online security and privacy. I frequently hear other students complain about the
password requirements to log into myBucknell or having to grab their phone to use
two-factor authenticatoin to confirm a login attempt. To aid in the second goal of
this thesis, I aim to describe the benefits and importance of certain practices with
regard to security and privacy to encourage better habits.
1.3 Background
This background section serves to provide an intuition for how common privacy issues
are. Additionally, I will comment on and provide a general explanation of Bayesian
Inference as a method of extracting meaningful information from user data. This
section also includes a primer on ethical theories used later in this thesis to examine
the moral dilemmas presented by social media data collection. I argue that knowledge
and consideration of these theories can benefit both the creators and users of online
technologies.
1.3.1 Bayesian Inference
As seen later in this thesis, most users do not understand how their seemingly incon-
sequential actions each time they use a social media platform are recorded and used
to inform advertising decisions made by the platform. To address this lack of un-
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derstanding, this section describes one mechanism by which user behavior and data
can be used to inform targeted advertising. Tanaka et al. (2016) demonstrate the
power of monitoring user actions by creating a model that considers the purchase his-
tory and media advertisement views for a user and can produce valuable information
for advertisers. Tanaka et al. (2016) use an efficient Bayesian inference approach to
model likely purchase behavior of the users. In this section, I introduce a common
and powerful statistical tool that indicates the likelihood that a certain prediction is
true, given that another event or series of events have occurred.
Let’s start with an intuitive example. Say we are a social media company trying to
serve the most relevant ads to consumers to make them more likely to click them. We
have a user who we know recently booked a hotel in a tropical location, bought plane
tickets to that location, and bought sunscreen online. If we take all of these events
into account, we might conclude that the user can be convinced to purchase a new
swim suit. Similarly, if we have a user who is visiting extremist websites, looking for
instructions on making explosives, and following extremist accounts on our website,
then it is reasonable to expect the person has the potential to commit an act of terror.
I introduce here the foundational framework for Bayesian Inference. This is a
simpler version than what was used by Tanaka et al. (2016), but this form is enough
to understand the work. The formula below describes the general form of Bayesian
Inference.
P (H|E) = P (E|H) · P (H)
P (E)
(1.1)
In (1.1), the variable H takes the place of the hypothesis we are interested in while
E is the event we have or are expecting to observe. The value we are interested in,
P (H|E) is the probability that H will occur, given we observe E. P (H) is simply the
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likelihood of H generally being true. P (E) is the probability that we will observe the
specific event E. For instance, if P (H) is the probability that there will be a snow
day, and P (E) is the probability that it will snow. We assume P (E|H), which is the
probability that it is snowing given we have a snow day. From these values, we can
calculate P (H|E) which indicates the probability of having a snow day given it is
snowing.
1.3.2 Primer on Ethical Philosophy
This section draws heavily on reading from The Elements of Moral Philosophy by
James Rachels (7th ed.). The ethical theories presented here are used later to examine
dilemmas at the intersection of data collection and privacy. These descriptions of
several philosophies are not meant to be exhaustive, rather simply to provide a basic
understanding which will serve the reader well later in this thesis. Further reading in
Rachels (2012) or other sources is necessary to fully understand these ideas.
Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Many of Kant’s ideas focus on resolving moral dilemmas through the laws of “duty”,
respect for people, and what he calls the Categorical Imperative. According to Rachels
(2012), Kant presents the Categorical Imperative in a few different ways; one of the
formulations is as follows:
“Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that
of another, always as an end and never as a means only.”
Rachels (2012) explains that this idea of treating people ”as an end and never as
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a means” is essentially saying that we need to treat people with respect and never
manipulate other people in order to achieve our goals. Rachels (2012) continues that
treating people as an end extends to acting in ways to promote their well-being and
avoid harm.
Another formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative is: (Rachels 2012)
“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.”
This establishes a tool to guide one’s moral compass in the resolution of moral dilem-
mas. (Rachels 2012) When deciding how to act, one can use this to figure out what the
“maxim”, or rule, they would be following by taking an action and then considering
whether they would be comfortable with that rule being followed universally.
In one example Kant provides on applying this tool, he suggests that, perhaps,“I
refuse to give help to others thinking that I do not care and that each person can
fend for their self.” We cannot will this to be a universal rule because in times where
we need help from others, we would not want them to turn us away.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a consequentionalist ethical theory which argues that we must act
in a way to increase the net “happiness” in the world. Rachels (2012) describes the
three main propositions of Classical Utilitarianism as follows:
a) The morality of an action depends solely on the consequences of the
action; nothing else matters.
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b) An action’s consequences matter only insofar as they involve the
greater or lesser happiness of individuals.
c) In the assessment of consequences, each individual’s happiness gets
“equal consideration.” This means that equal amounts of happiness al-
ways count equally; nobody’s well-being matters more just because, for
instance, one is rich, or powerful, or good-looking. Morally, everyone
counts the same.
This description of Utilitarianism leads people to think that each particular action
needs to be judged for the effect it has on total happiness. Some argue, however, that
instead we should judge actions based on whether they abide by a set of rules designed
to optimize happiness. It is up to us to determine what this optimal set of rules is.
This new form of Utilitarianism is called Rule Utilitarianism while the original theory
is generally referred to as Act Utilitarianism.
1.3.3 Recent Major Privacy Blunders
This section highlights two major privacy blunders from the last few years that add
legitimacy to why privacy needs to be continuously studied and audited in order to
best protect users.
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica
The controversy around Cambridge Analytica from a privacy perspective is less dis-
cussed than the debate around whether the firm managed to sway the tide of the
2016 United States Presidential Election. When collecting the data from Facebook,
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Cambridge Analytica worked with an academic, Aleksandr Kogan, running a survey
that disguised as a personality test (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018). The
users who took the personality test agreed to participate in academic research, how-
ever, what was not made clear is that the information of these users’ friends was also
collected (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018). This meant that users did not
have to personally give consent if one of their friends did. While Facebook did not
actually collect the data, the company should still be responsible for how external
companies can access user information and what kinds of consent are necessary on
the user level. In this case especially, where the political direction of a country may
have been influenced the burden is significantly higher.
Zoom
When nearly every private and public school from kindergarten through 12th grade
and higher education switched to a remote learning method as well as many people
working remotely in Spring 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many chose
Zoom as their solution to host video lectures and online classrooms. This led to Zoom
seeing 200 million daily users in March 2020 compared to just 10 million in December
2019 (Bond 2020). While the article from NPR spends a fair amount of time discussing
the issue of ‘Zoombombing’, what is more interesting for my work is a sentence at the
end pointing to an article. The article references a report where Zoom was sharing
data with Facebook, even on Zoom users who did not have Facebook accounts (Bond
2020). Zoom acknowledged this report claiming that this functionality was a mistake,
but it begs the question of how this even happened and makes the oversight on Zoom’s
part extremely evident.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter highlights existing work on this topic, comparing opposing views, both
in support of data collection and in support of user privacy. In general, the literature I
found that supports data collection demonstrates that data collected from online users
can be used for justifiably beneficial purposes. Academics work toward improving the
world and advancing technology, and so are less concerned with the profit earning
side of data collection that is a concern for social media companies. I have chosen
to explore current and recent events for content of this literature review as well to
broaden the range of available resources and discussion. To that end, I am including
references from news articles, doing my best to share only facts to accurately represent
the situations at hand.
2.1 Understanding Privacy
It is important to ground the meaning of privacy in literature. Nissenbaum (2015) ar-
gues that concern over privacy should not be focused on the sheer amount of data used
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but how appropriate the use is, calling this contextual integrity. citeMartin2016MeasuringVariables
elaborate that the advantage to defining privacy as contextual integrity creates a dis-
tinction between loss of privacy and loss of information. Thus, the flow of information
itself is not seen as harmful as long as it fits the context. For example, the sharing
of medical information with a physician, or financial information with the Internal
Revenue Service (Martin and Nissenbaum 2016). However, when the flow of infor-
mation is no longer appropriate for the context, then this is a loss of privacy (Martin
and Nissenbaum 2016). Referring to the previous example, if a healthcare provider is
then selling the shared information without the individual’s permission then we see
a privacy violation.
While this thesis focuses mostly on how the individual interacts with privacy, it
is important to note the work of Boyd (2012) on the idea of “networked privacy”.
Networked privacy addresses how the actions of an individual or group affect people
beyond that individual or group (Boyd 2012). Boyd (2012) gives the example of the
popular DNA testing company 23andMe. When an individual submits their DNA
sample to be sequenced and studied, they are also providing information on anyone
related to them and any descendants they may have. This can all be done without
obtaining permission from all of these other people. Networked privacy is one key
aspect of the privacy failure discussed earlier in Section 1.3.3. Boyd (2012) argues
that privacy models need to be developed that put groups and communities at the
center of the discussion instead of the individual.
2.2 In Support of Data Collection
The work of Sinha et al. (2016) demonstrates the value of social media companies
making user data accessible. Sinha et al. (2016) developed a natural language pro-
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cessing (NLP) system to process posts on Facebook and other social media platforms.
They used this information to identify user posts regarding issues on the public tran-
sit system in Bangalore. The expected application of this research would be to more
rapidly identify and correct issues with the public transit system. While this work
was in very early stages at the time of publishing, the potential to improve a city’s
awareness of issues with the transit system and accelerate the response is incredible.
This work is a strong advocate for continued access to user data on social media
platforms.
Similar to public transit, public health efforts can be supported by data collection.
With the COVID-19 pandemic currently wreaking havoc around the world, data is
being collected in a number of ways to try and monitor the spread of the disease.
One extremely surprising development is a partnership announced between Apple and
Google to develop a set of application programming interfaces (APIs) that developers
can include in their applications for either platform Newsroom (2020). At its core, this
partnership is creating technologies that are meant to help track the spread of COVID-
19. This includes using the Bluetooth radios in smartphones to monitor contact
between individuals and alert users if they have been in contact with someone who
is later confirmed to have the disease after the user reports the diagnoses through an
application linked to their medical provider (Greenberg 2020). Apple’s press release
emphasizes that “Privacy, transparency, and consent are of utmost importance in this
effort...” indicating that this would be purely opt in and users would be fully aware
of their participation (Newsroom 2020). The advantage of the design of this system is
that it uses Bluetooth to connect two phones and leave an anonymous token behind
that would then be compared to a database of tokens of people who have reported
receiving a positive diagnosis of viral infection. The people who have been near the
person with the virus would then receive a notification informing them that they may
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have been exposed. The advantage of Bluetooth is that it eliminates the need for
GPS tracking and broadcasting the location of every user, instead just relying on the
individual device to communicate with the nearby devices and swap tokens, reducing
privacy concerns. It should also be noted that there are legitimate situations where
data can be collected ethically and the context determines the appropriate flow of
information, as discussed in Section 2.1
Based on contextual integrity as discussed by Nissenbaum (2015), contact tracing
seems appropriate assuming it is done safely. However, Selinger and Leong (2020)
raise an important question as to whether contact tracing is medically necessary to
protecting public health during the pandemic. The point being that if it is not medi-
cally necessary, then the risks are too great (Selinger and Leong 2020). Additionally,
if it is not necessary then the context is no longer appropriate from a contextual
integrity persepctive.
Another example of data collection to monitor the pandemic came from Ghost
Data, a research group in Italy and the United States that collected location and
post information from over 500,000 public Instagram accounts in March 2020 (Alfred
Ng 2020). The purpose of the data collection was to provide data to the Italian
government as to whether citizens were obeying the quarantine order issued by the
Prime Minister on March 9, 2020. Facebook, Instagram’s parent company, responded
that the act of scraping user profiles violates Facebook’s policies and that they are
investigating (Alfred Ng 2020).
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2.3 In Support of User Privacy
The literature that acts in support of user privacy typically tries to explain why
users might feel their privacy is being limited, or what problems exist that allow
so much data to be collected. Herder and Zhang (2019) discuss how advertising on
social media, specifically Facebook, frequently appears creepy to users. They identify
that “the key to creepiness appears to be the uncertainty about possible threats and
the uneasiness due to a lack of social norms” (Herder and Zhang 2019). Following
their study and discussion with users, they identify the key point that “explanations
and transparency seem to reduce users’ anxiety and increase trust only to a certain
extent...”. In their study, Herder and Zhang (2019) found that users were dissatisfied
with explanations for the advertisements that the user did not deem specific enough.
What causes users surprise and discomfort is that the ads seem to indicate that the
system has access to information that it should not.
While explanations for advertising seem to placate user fears slightly, the work of
Jordan and Rand (2019) says that it should not be surprising that users do not know
what is being collected. In this study, the researchers created a fake social media page
and monitored how much time the users actually spent reading the Terms of Service
agreement and the Privacy Policy. They found that users frequently indicated that
they do care about privacy. When they asked the users to self report how much time
they spent reading these documents while signing up for a new service, the responses
indicated that the average should be about five minutes. In reality, based on the
data collected by the fake service, average engagement was about one minute and the
median was a mere fourteen seconds. This seems to indicate that while users claim
to be concerned about privacy, they value their time spent both reading the policies
and understanding to what they are agreeing more than the privacy itself.
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One argument is that users value their time more than understanding the ToS,
but they may not be offered a meaningful choice. It can be argued that the social
and, in some cases, financial cost of not using web services is so great that users have
no choice but to accept the terms presented to them (Nissenbaum 2015). Referencing
Nissenbaum (2009), Susser (2019) argues that privacy is a set of social norms not
individual decisions. Individuals can not be made to decide the fate of a “social
good” and this decision should be made before the service is presented to the user
(Susser 2019).
Focusing on application level security, an experiment on the campus of the Uni-
versity of California Santa Cruz demonstrated the need for companies to consciously
develop their software with user privacy in mind. Xue et al. (2016) used machine
learning to identify the original location of posts to Yik Yak (a, now defunct, so-
cial media where users could post anonymous messages only visible to those within
a certain geographic range) with an average error of just 106 meters. Yik Yak was
advertised as a fully anonymous platform, offering users a sense of security and pri-
vacy, however, Xue et al. (2016) managed to strip away a level of that privacy in
pinpointing the location of the posts. While this research was reported to Yik Yak
so they could pursue a fix, it still points to an oversight made by the company in the
first place.
2.4 Conclusion
Ultimately, either side of this debate make strong points. The examples in support
of data collection present situations where having more data is indisputably valuable.
This is especially obvious in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, one might
argue that the emergency situation might make people more willing to give up their
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privacy which may be difficult to recover once the disease is contained. Similarly, the
literature supporting user privacy places the burden on companies to provide greater
transparency and choice to the user. Additionally, as seen in the work of Xue et al.
(2016), the burden is on the developers to provide a high standard of security and
privacy.
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Chapter 3
A Survey Experiment
My reading of the literature made me question how the people at Bucknell interact
with privacy ideas leading me to create a survey. The survey was motivated by
attempting to understand the source of the ambivalence regarding online privacy
and data collection informally observed within the student population at Bucknell.
The survey seeks to put data to the work of Winkler and Zeadally (2016), either
confirming the assertion that users do not understand the privacy policies to which
they are agreeing, or indicating that the ambivalence comes from another source.
3.1 Survey Method
The survey was conducted with approval by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) via
Qualtrics over a period of about two and a half weeks. There were 130 participants,
consisting of faculty, staff, and students at Bucknell University. The questions gauge
user experience with topics of online privacy and security, then inquire as to the user’s
typical behavior when interacting with social media websites. The survey consisted
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of mostly multiple choice questions where participants rated their agreement with
statements. Two questions asked participants to enter, into a text box, all the types
of information they thought were collected by Facebook and Google. Participants
were given the opportunity to enter a drawing to win one of four gift certificates, each
worth $25, to encourage a greater number of participants. The raffle was conducted
through Qualtrics as well, and the entries were kept separate from the responses to
the actual study. The full survey instrument can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Expected Results Prior to Survey
Based on the work of Winkler and Zeadally (2016) as well as the work of Kaiser
(2016), my assumption is that most users, especially if they do not routinely study
privacy and security, are unlikely to have a significant understanding of the amount of
information that is collected and the various types. The work of Winkler and Zeadally
(2016) indicates that around half of all users likely cannot read at a high enough grade
level (based on the Fleisch-Kincaid metric) to fully understand the terms of service or
privacy policies of most popular social networks. Kaiser (2016) conducted a similar
survey, concluding that younger demographics are more aware of privacy issues and
perceive less privacy when searching online than older demographics. This conclusion
will be interesting to compare to the results of my survey. I should be able to compare
the general attitudes of students to those of faculty and staff. My expectation is that
that vast majority of respondents do not read the terms of service or privacy policy
in its entirety when signing up for new services.
Ideally the responses will be diverse in terms of departmental affiliation and re-
search experience on the topic. This will provide the most useful result especially be-
cause computer science and technology focused individuals are probably more likely
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to be more educated on the topic.
3.3 Survey Results
The survey gathered 130 participants, primarily coming from Science and Math, En-
gineering, and Social Sciences. The other category in the chart below includes par-
ticipants from various non-academic departments, and students who indicated they
were undecided for their major. This spread of backgrounds for the participants en-
sures that the data provides a reasonable image of behaviors and opinions at Bucknell
because the results are not dominated by any particular field or discipline. This dis-
tribution was not specifically selected, although the survey was advertised through
my various social networks on campus which I knew would be diverse in terms of
departmental affiliation. I also asked faculty I knew well to distribute the survey
within their department.
Figure 3.1
The figure below illustrates the university affiliation of all of the survey partici-
pants. The vast majority of survey participants were current students. Six and seven
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percent of the participants were staff and faculty respectively.
Figure 3.2
3.3.1 Qualitative Results
The survey asked participants to enter in a text box what information they thought
Facebook and Google collected on their users. The responses are organized according
to the categories identified in Winkler and Zeadally (2016)(see Figure 3.3) In gen-
eral, most users recognized that these companies collect and keep records of Personal
Identifiable Information (PII). Similarly, many users recognized that these platforms
collect both location information and on-platform-activity. Some participants cor-
rectly identified that Facebook also monitors off-platform-activity as well. Many of
the same participants also believed that Google monitors off platform activity, how-
ever, according to the work of Winkler and Zeadally (2016), Google’s privacy policy
does not indicate that off platform activity is monitored. No participants explicitly
mentioned the collection of device information with regard to either platform. Three
specific participants may have been trying express this idea when they entered that
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the platforms collect IP addresses and photo metadata. I reached this conclusion
based on the fact that photo metadata typically includes what device was used to
take the photo. Device information is more specific with regard to the type of de-
vice (laptop/desktop, tablet, phone, etc.) and even browser type, as this information
is used by developers to maintain support for different devices. It is interesting to
note that while both Facebook and Google collect and store payment information, no
participants entered this when asked about Facebook, and very few identified that
Google stores payment information.
Figure 3.3: From Winkler and Zeadally (2016), cropped to include only platforms of in-
terest
While many participants failed to correctly identify one or more of the categories
used by Winkler and Zeadally (2016), others suggested some types of information are
collected that Winkler and Zeadally (2016) do not identify. Some examples include,
medical information, or that their phones are constantly recording everything they
say to inform ad targeting. Several users also simply said “all of it” while others listed
a few specific categories then included “everything” or “all of it” as a catch-all. While
these answers are technically incorrect, they are indicative of the perception that some
users have regarding the sheer quantity of data collected by these platforms.
This idea is evident in that when asked “How frequently do you feel that ads
you see online or on social media are unnervingly relevant? (For example, you see
an advertisement for something you were just discussing with another person.),”
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with little exception, the responses were overwhelmingly towards the affirmative.
This phenomenon is likely why people frequently share anecdotes about how they
think their phones are listening to them because they talk about something and then
immediately see an advertisement for it.
3.3.2 Quantitative Results
Figure 3.4 contains a significant amount of insight into the behaviors and attitudes
of the participants. The survey presented the participants with a series of statements
(seen below) and asked them to rank their level of agreement. Of particular interest,
are the first three statements on the left side of Figure 3.4. The general opinion is
that internet companies collect too much information, but also users generally do
not know what information is being collected or how to access the records of their
data. While the second and third statements on the right half of Figure 3.4 do not
have a significant skew towards agree or disagree, this result still tells an interesting
story. Because in both cases, about half of the respondents indicate that they either
do not know how to use the privacy features available to them or they do not use
these features. It is probably safe to assume (and should be confirmed with further
study) that those who do not know what features exist, are also the users who are not
using them. There should be a reasonable amount of responsibility put on internet
companies to find and fill the gap in user understanding of how to protect their privacy
while using each particular platform.1
1The last statement on the right side of the figure was included to confirm the results of the first
statement.
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Figure 3.4: Levels of agreement to different statements regarding online behavior and
opinions. See Figure 3.5 for legend.
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Figure 3.5: Legend for Figure 3.4
DefaXOW ReSRUWOnline Privacy and Social Media
MaUch 2, 2020 6:35 AM MST
Q7 - HRZ fUeTXeQWO\ dR \RX feeO WhaW adV \RX Vee RQOiQe RU RQ VRciaO Pedia aUe
XQQeUYiQgO\ UeOeYaQW? (FRU e[aPSOe, \RX Vee aQ adYeUWiVePeQW fRU VRPeWhiQg \RX ZeUe
jXVW diVcXVViQg ZiWh aQRWheU SeUVRQ.) End of ReÜoßë A great deal  A lot  A moderate amount  A little  None at allƽƺɟA great deal ƽǃɟA lot ƼƼɟA moderate amountș Field Minimum Maximum Mean StdDeviation Variance Countƻ How frequentlĂ do Ăou feel that ads Ăou see online or on socialmedia are unnervinglĂ relevantȜ ȨFor exampleȔ Ăou see anadvertisement for something Ăou were just discussing with anotherpersonțȩ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ Ƽțƻƺ ƺțǃǁ ƺțǃƾ ǂǃShowing rows ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ A great deal ƽƺțƽƾɟ ƼǁƼ A lot ƽǃțƽƽɟ ƽƿƽ A moderate amount ƼƼțƾǁɟ Ƽƺƾ A little ƿțǀƼɟ ƿƿ None at all ƼțƼƿɟ ƼǂǃFigure 3.6: Participant reactions to how frequently they feel the ads they see are unnerv-ingly relevant.Figure 3.6 shows that participants overwhelmingly said that they frequently seeadvertisements that appear to be unnervingly relevant. With 91% of the participantssaying that a least a moderate amount of advertisements they see online are unnerv-ingly relevant. This connects to anecdotal conversations I have had with peers, wherethey report believing that their phones and other devices are listening to their con-versations and that this informs advertising. This survey data adds to the evidence
that users do not understand the mechanisms behind targeted advertising and what
they can do to protect their information.
Figure 3.7 indicates that most users typically do not read any part of the Terms
of Service (ToS) or Privacy policy when registering for a new service. It is interesting
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to note that in Figure 3.8, 7% of respondents said that they do not read any of the
ToS or Privacy Policy. I find this interesting because participants were only asked
how much of the ToS or Privacy Policy they read if they indicated that they read
these documents with any frequency in the previous question.
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Q8 - HRZ fUeTXeQWl\ dR \RX Uead Whe TeUPV Rf SeUYice/UVeU AgUeePeQW/PUiYac\ PRlic\
ZheQ VigQiQg XS fRU a QeZ ZebViWe RU VeUYice?End of ReÜoßë AlüaĂs  Most of the time  About half the time  Sometimes  NeûerƼƻɟSometimes ǀǀɟNeûerș Field Minimum Maāimum Mean StdDeûiation Variance Countƻ Hoü frequentlĂ do Ăou read the Terms of SerûiceȡUserAgreementȡPriûacĂ PolicĂ ühen signing up for a neü üebsite orserûiceȜ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ ƾțƾƾ ƺțǃǁ ƺțǃƾ ǂǃShoüing roüs ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ AlüaĂs ƼțƼƿɟ ƼƼ Most of the time ƿțǀƼɟ ƿƽ About half the time ƾțƾǃɟ ƾƾ Sometimes Ƽƻțƽƿɟ ƻǃƿ Neûer ǀǀțƼǃɟ ƿǃǂǃFigure 3.7: Participant rating of how frequently they read the Terms of Service or PrivacyPolicy for any service for which they register.DefaXlW ReSRUWOnline Privacy and Social MediaMaUch 2, 2020 6:36 AM MSTQ9 - HRZ mXch Rf Whe TeUmV Rf SeUYice/UVeU AgUeemenW/PUiYac\ PRlic\ dR \RX Uead?End of ReÜoßë All Ȩƽɟȩ  A lot Ȩƻƾɟȩ  A moderate amount ȨƼƾɟȩ  A little ȨƿƼɟȩ  None at all Ȩǁɟȩƻƾɟ Ƽƾɟ ƿƼɟș Field Minimum Maximum Mean StdDeviation Variance Countƻ How much of the Terms of ServiceȡUser AgreementȡPrivacĂ PolicĂ doĂou readȜ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ ƽțƾƿ ƺțǃƽ ƺțǂǁ ƼǃShowing rows ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ All ƽțƾƿɟ ƻƼ A lot ƻƽțǁǃɟ ƾƽ A moderate amount Ƽƾțƻƾɟ ǁƾ A little ƿƻțǁƼɟ ƻƿƿ None at all ǀțǃƺɟ ƼƼǃFigure 3.8: Participant rating of how much of the the Terms of Service or Privacy Policythey read for any service for which they register.Gauging Expertise on Privacy Issues of Survey ParticipantsFigure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and Figure 3.11 all indicate that the majority of participantsare not generally familiar with privacy issues. Most participants do not frequently take
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an interest in discussing or researching the recent events surrounding online privacy.
For these questions it is especially important to note that there was at least one outlier
who identified in the survey that they have made these issues part of their primary
research. Removing this individual makes the claim even stronger that the typical
user in the study rarely discusses or studies issues and ideas around online privacy.
While it is interesting to have data to support this idea, it comes as no surprise
that most participants do not discuss or research these issues regularly. However,
specific interest in this niche field should not be a prerequisite for understanding
what information social media companies are collecting.
DefaXlW RepoUWOnline Privacy and Social Media
MaUch 2, 2020 6:37 AM MST
Q10 - HoZ fUeqXenWl\ do \oX Uead neZV aUWicleV oU academic papeUV UelaWed Wo online
pUiYac\ oU daWa pUiYac\? End of ReÜoßë DailĂ  ƾȭǀ times a week  ƻȭƽ times a week  Less than ƻ time a week  Neverƻǀɟƻȭƽ times a week ƾǃɟLess than ƻ time a week ƽƻɟNeverș Field Minimum Maximum Mean StdDeviation Variance Countƻ How frequentlĂ do Ăou read news articles or academic papers relatedto online privacĂ or data privacĂȜ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ ƾțƺƼ ƺțǃƺ ƺțǂƼ ǂǂShowing rows ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ DailĂ ƽțƾƻɟ ƽƼ ƾȭǀ times a week ƻțƻƾɟ ƻƽ ƻȭƽ times a week ƻƿțǃƻɟ ƻƾƾ Less than ƻ time a week ƾǂțǂǀɟ ƾƽƿ Never ƽƺțǀǂɟ ƼǁǂǂFigure 3.9: Frequency of which participants read articles related to online privacy issues.DefaXlW ReporWOnline Privacy and Social MediaMarch 2, 2020 6:37 AM MSTQ11 - HoZ freqXenWl\ do \oX diVcXVV online priYac\ or daWa priYac\ ZiWh peerV?End of ReÜoßë DailĂ  ƾȭǀ times a week  ƻȭƽ times a week  Less than ƻ time a week  Neverƽƻɟƻȭƽ times a week ƾǂɟLess than ƻ time a week ƻǀɟNeverș Field Minimum Maximum Mean StdDeviation Variance Countƻ How frequentlĂ do Ăou discuss online privacĂ or data privacĂ withpeersȜ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ ƽțǁƺ ƺțǂǂ ƺțǁǂ ǂǂShowing rows ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ DailĂ ƽțƾƻɟ ƽƼ ƾȭǀ times a week ƼțƼǁɟ Ƽƽ ƻȭƽ times a week ƽƺțǀǂɟ Ƽǁƾ Less than ƻ time a week ƾǁțǁƽɟ ƾƼƿ Never ƻƿțǃƻɟ ƻƾǂǂFigure 3.10: Frequency of which participants discuss online privacy issues with their peers.
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Q12 - HoZ freqXentl\ do \oX research online priYac\, data priYac\, or related issXes?End of ReÜoßë DailĂ  ƾȭǀ times a week  ƻȭƽ times a week  Less than ƻ time a week  NeverƾƺɟLess than ƻ time a week ƿƺɟNeverș Field Minimum Maximum Mean StdDeviation Variance Countƻ How frequentlĂ do Ăou research online privacĂȔ data privacĂȔ orrelated issuesȜ ƻțƺƺ ƿțƺƺ ƾțƽƿ ƺțǂƺ ƺțǀƾ ǂǂShowing rows ƻ ȭ ǀ of ǀș Field ChoiceCountƻ DailĂ ƻțƻƾɟ ƻƼ ƾȭǀ times a week ƼțƼǁɟ Ƽƽ ƻȭƽ times a week ǀțǂƼɟ ǀƾ Less than ƻ time a week ƽǃțǁǁɟ ƽƿƿ Never ƿƺțƺƺɟ ƾƾǂǂFigure 3.11: Frequency of which participants research online privacy issues.3.4 ConclusionThe survey confirm d my expectations and generally agreed with the work of Winklerand Zeadally (2016) and Kaiser (2016) which motivated my study. From this data,it is important to note that the average Bucknell student is not very familiar with
privacy issues, most users do not have a complete understanding of what information
is collected, and most participants do not read any significant portion of the Terms of
Service or Privacy Policy when signing up for a new service or website. Additionally,
there was not a significant difference between the understanding demonstrated by
science, technology, engineering, or math affiliated participants and the understanding
of participants affiliated with humanities and social sciences.
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Chapter 4
A Better Business Model For
Social Networks
Based on my survey, it is clear that many people at Bucknell feel too much data is
collected, but I did not address how highly they value their privacy. This is addressed
in a 2015 Pew Research Center study where participants were asked generally how
important privacy is to them (Madden and Rainie 2015). In this study, 93% of par-
ticipants said that controlling who can get information about them is important and
90% said it is important for them to be able to control what information is collected
about them (Madden and Rainie 2015). A later study also from the Pew Research
Center found that 81% of U.S. adults feel they lack control over what information
companies collect on them and that the risks outweigh the benefits (Auxier et al.
2019). Additionally, 79% also said they are concerned over who uses the data that is
collected (Auxier et al. 2019).
I have proposed an alternative business model for social media companies that
avoids the ethical issue of selling user data (Brown 2019). The idea I propose is a
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tiered structure to social media user types (See Figure 4.1). A free tier where the user
agrees to let the company collect and sell their information, and a paid tier where the
user still uses the service, but the company cannot collect or sell their information or
show them advertisements. While this does not fully satisfy Kant because technically
the users are still a means to an end, the choice and greater level of informed consent
are a step in the right direction.
Figure 4.1: Tiered account type for proposed business model.
One problem with this solution is that it disadvantages those who cannot afford
to pay for their privacy. An alteration to the solution above might also include a
paid, but much less expensive, middle tier that still serves ads to the user but the
advertising is only informed by an even more limited scope of their information beyond
restrictive privacy settings. These solutions also put the social media companies on
firmer ground with the Utilitarian philosophy because restoring some choice to the
users should, theoretically, be a step towards maximizing happiness.
This presents the question of why should anyone have to pay for their privacy?
While it would be nice if everyone could retain full control of their information for
free, selling targeted advertisements is how many internet companies make money
and are able to pay their employees. If a significant portion of a platform’s users
wish to keep their data private, it lessens the value of the advertising products the
company offers to its customers. Thus, the lost revenue must be made up in order
for the company to remain in business. This is why users who choose to opt out of
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data collection would need to pay for the service.
I tested this idea in my survey, asking participants if they would be willing to
pay for a service that did not collect their information. It did not gain a lot of favor
with about 66% of respondents saying either that they would not want to pay or that
they are neutral towards the idea. This is contrary to the result of a Pew Research
Center study where 51% of U.S. adults in the study deemed the trade-off of a free
social media platform being able to use their data being unacceptable while 33% said
it was acceptable and 15% commented that it would depend on context (Rainie and
Duggan 2016). This response indicates that there would likely be support for a paid
service that could not collect information on its users.
Regardless of whatever pay structure a company decides to implement, meaningful
choice is vastly important. As seen in the work of Winkler and Zeadally (2016),
Jordan and Rand (2019), and Herder and Zhang (2019) and the survey that I ran,
users often simply do not understand to what they are agreeing. This can be due to
their unwillingness to read a long legal document, their own lack of understanding
of the technology, or the obfuscation of what the user needs to know by unnecessary
legalese. Or, as argued by Nissenbaum (2009), users lack meaningful choice and
simply have to agree because the cost of not using the service is too great. But it
should not require a college degree to large amounts of outside research to understand
how social media companies know so much about us. As stated in the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) guidelines for Ethically Aligned Design:
A fundamental need is that people have the right to define access and
provide informed consent with respect to the use of their personal digital
data. Individuals require mechanisms to help curate their unique identity
and personal data in conjunction with policies and practices that make
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them explicitly aware of consequences resulting from the bundling or resale
of their personal information (IEEE SA 2017).
From what I have presented in this work, it’s clear many companies are failing
to meet this standard. To better follow the IEEE standard above, companies should
provide a brief page, in language no more advanced than a seventh grade level (when
many children turn 13 and can register for a Facebook account according to Face-
book’s ToS) that outlines what information is collected and what is done with it.
Social media companies could also implement privacy features akin to smartphone
operating systems that allow third parties temporary access certain information. Sim-
ilar to how phones provide an option for an application to access your location “just
this time” or for an hour, a similar feature on social media would restore a much
higher level of control to the user.
A common question with this recommendation is whether the legalese is just
a necessary evil to create a binding document. Simply put, it is unnecessary. GE
Aviation’s digital services business began an initiative in 2014 to write plain-language
contracts with an overwhelmingly positive result Burton (2018). So if this went so
well, why are other companies not following suit? They seem keen to hide behind
confusing language and should be compelled to provide the ToS in plain language.
4.1 Conclusion
Ultimately, in order to maintain their revenue, social media companies could choose
to offer various paid options that limit or eliminate the data the company is allowed
to collect and share with advertisers. However regardless of a paid offering, social
media companies should absolutely be required to gain informed consent from their
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users, clearly indicating what data is collected and how it is used.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have shown my motivation for exploring this topic, provided a synopsis
of some of the literature and current events around data collection and user privacy
issues. Additionally, I reported the results of a survey that I created and ran on
Bucknell University’s campus that explored the opinions and behaviors of Bucknell
students, faculty, and staff. Finally, I demonstrated that users feel their privacy is
important and proposed a potential solution to the issues I identified in how social
media platforms collect data and allow users to control their data.
In Chapter 2, the work Herder and Zhang (2019) and Jordan and Rand (2019)
makes it clear that users are uncertain about what is collected and do not take the time
to read the Terms of Service. These findings were confirmed by the results reported
in Chapter 3, strengthening the argument made by Winkler and Zeadally (2016) that
Terms of Service and Privacy Policies are not written in language accessible to many
users or presented in a way that encourages the user to actually pay attention to the
information. Considering these observations and arguments, along with the evidence
from Madden and Rainie (2015) and Auxier et al. (2019) that people value their
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privacy, in Chapter 4, I propose an alternative to the free, advertisement supported
social media platform. I also emphasize that users give informed consent to their data
being collected meaning that the ToS and Privacy Policy need to be presented in a
quickly digestible and understandable way.
5.1 Future Work
Over the course of my research I ran into questions that were out of scope for this
thesis, but might provide interesting extensions or continuations of my work. Regard-
ing more concise ToS and privacy policies, it would be interesting to know where the
middle ground between “too short to be informative” and “too long to read to hold
the user’s attention” lies. Another topic to explore would be whether an equivalent
to the EU’s GDPR would be helpful in anyway to American users. It would also be
relevant to explore the economics of a paid social media platform using the tiered
structure I suggest to determine its feasibility.
Additionally, another topic to explore would be an annual privacy audit that the
platform directs the user through where they learn about the privacy features available
and what data is being collected. Studying this for user opinion and willingness to
actually do it along with the proper format and allotted could potentially completely
change the priority that many people assign to their privacy
Finally, while I focused on how individuals interact with privacy, the ideas brought
up in Section 2.1 by the work of Boyd (2012) provide an interesting counterpoint to
my solution. Modelling privacy with the public as the focus rather the individual
might provide generally cleaner solutions.
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Student
Faculty
Staff
Other (please specify)
Block 1
Online Privacy and Social Media
Informed Consent Bucknell University
 
You are invited to participate in a research study about attitudes and behaviors related to
online privacy and data collected by social media. If you agree, you will be presented with a
brief, anonymous survey (expected to take no more than 10 minutes) that will ask about your
perception of social media, your engagement with privacy issues, and your online behavior as
it pertains to privacy. We believe that this will help our research team understand how the
majority of users engage with online privacy and inform analysis of the practices employed by
social media companies. Your participation is fully voluntary and you may discontinue your
participation at any time. There are no risks anticipated for this study. We will not be asking
you for any personally identifying information. The research team hopes to recruit around
400 participants.
At the end of the survey, you will be asked if you would like to be entered in a drawing for one
of four $25 gift certificates to Downtown Lewisburg. The drawing will take place on February
7th, 2020 with notifications to winners coming shortly after.
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may contact the Principal
Investigator, Matt Brown, by phone at (203) 501-9875 or email at msb027@bucknell.edu.
General questions or concerns about the rights of human subjects of research may be directed
to the chair of the Institutional Review Board at Bucknell: Matthew Slater at
matthew.slater@bucknell.edu or x72767
 
By clicking ‘Agree’ below, I affirm that I am 18 years of age or older:
 
Agree Disagree
Default Question Block
What is your primary area of study? (e.g. major, department, or specialization)
What is your affiliation with Bucknell?
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Block 2
What information do you think Facebook collects on its users? Please enter as many as you can think of
separated by commas.
What information do you think Google collects on its users? Please enter as many as you can think of
separated by commas.
Block 3
To what degree to you agree with the following statements?
   
Strongly
disagree Disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Somewhat
agree Agree
Strongly
agree
Internet Companies collect too
much information   
I understand what information
websites collect on me   
I know how to access the
information stored on me by
websites like Facebook and
Google
  
I prefer to see ads that are
relevant to me   
I would be willing to pay a
subscription fee for social
media and other websites if it
meant they could no longer
collect data on me
  
I know how to use to privacy
features in social media and on
my phone to limit or allow data
to be collected
  
I use privacy features on social
media and on my phone to limit
what data is collected
  
Internet companies do not
collect enough information   
Block 4
How frequently do you feel that ads you see online or on social media are unnervingly relevant? (For example,
you see an advertisement for something you were just discussing with another person.)
A great deal A lot A moderate amount A little None at all
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Daily
4-6 times a week
1-3 times a week
Less than 1 time a week
Never
Daily
4-6 times a week
1-3 times a week
Less than 1 time a week
Never
Daily
4-6 times a week
1-3 times a week
Less than 1 time a week
Never
How frequently do you read the Terms of Service/User Agreement/Privacy Policy when signing up for a new
website or service? 
Always Most of the time About half the time Sometimes Never
How much of the Terms of Service/User Agreement/Privacy Policy do you read?
All A lot A moderate amount A little None at all
How frequently do you read news articles or academic papers related to online privacy or data privacy?
How frequently do you discuss online privacy or data privacy with peers?
How frequently do you research online privacy, data privacy, or related issues?
Block 5
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Thank you for your participation! Would you like to be entered in the drawing for one of four Lewisburg
Dollars gift certificates worth $25?
Yes No
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